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FIRST NATIONS AND THE C®NSTITUTI
QUESTION ®F TRUST
2 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 .
Brian Slattery*
Toronto
* Brian Slattery, of Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Ontario.
This article argues . that the fiduciary relationship between Aboriginal peoples and
the Crown is a specialinstance ofa generaldoctrine ofcollective trustthat animates
the Canadian Constitution as a whole. This doctrine sheds light on the federal
structure of Canada the unique status of Quebec, and theposition ofFirst Nations
as a self-governing polities within Confederation. The article explores the origins
and character of the constitutional trust, and considers its application to issues
surrounding the inherent Aboriginal right ofself-government and Aboriginal land
rights
Dans cet article l'auteur suggère que la relation fiduciaire qui existe entre les
peuples autochtones et la couronne est une application particulière dune doctrine
générale defiducie collectivesous-jacente à l'ensemble de la constitution canadienne.
Cette doctrine aide à comprendre la structure fédérale du Canada, le statut spécial
du Québec etlaposition despremières nations en tantqu'entitéspolitiquesautonomes
dans la confédération. L'auteur examine les origines et la nature de la fiducie
constitutionnelle et considère son application pour ce qui a trait au droit inhérent
des Autochtones à l'autonomie gouvernementale et à leur droit à des territoires
All persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly
and awefully impressed with an idea that they act in trust . . .
Edmund Burke'
Introduction
What is the legal status of First Nations? Are they, as some say, simply
subordinate bodies, like municipalities, that owe their existence and powers
to legislation such as the Indian Act?2 Or are they, as others maintain,
long-suppressed sovereign nations rightfully entitled to recognition at the
international level? To put the question in another way, are Aboriginal
peoples ordinary subjects of the gown with no authority beyond what
I am indebted to Kent Mcleleil, Shin Imai and Phil Tunley for their valuable comments
on an earlier version of this article. I would also like to thank the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada and Osgoode Hall Law School for making time
available for research and writing .
i Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) (C.C . O'Brien (ed), 1969), p. 190.
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the state has given them, or do they have an inherent right ofself-government
that transcends the confines of the Canadian state?
This article will defend a position that lies between these polar extremes .
Under this view, First Nations possess inherent and sovereign authority
over their own affairs, which does not owe its existence to the Indian
Act or other legislation. This Aboriginal right of self-government has been
entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 .3 However, as with
the Federal and Provincial governments, the powers of Aboriginal gov-
ernments are limited in scope and can be exercised only within the context
of the Canadian Confederation .
This intermediate viewpoint invites a number of questions . What is
the source of the "inherent" governmental authority of First Nations, if
not the Canadian state? If the authority is truly "sovereign", how can
it be characterized as limited in scope? Can it actually be reconciled with
the continued presence of First Nations within Confederation, or does it
lead logically down a slippery slope to independence? In the course of
the paper, I will suggest answers to these and other related questions. In
doing this, it will also be necessary to offer what amounts to a new account
of the Constitution as a whole.
Let us begin with the framework laid down in recent judgments of
the SupremeCourt of Canada . This involves a number of basic propositions,
which can be summarized as follows . In pre-European times, the indigenous
peoples of Canada were sovereign and independent nations controlling
their own territories and ruling themselves under their own laws .4 In various
stages, these nations passed under the sovereignty of the Crown, and their
members are now Canadian subjects .5 Nevertheless, First Nations continue
3 Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c.11 .
4 In Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, at p. 383,
(1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, at p. 195, Hall J. adopted the view of Chief Justice Marshall
of the United States Supreme Court in Worcester v. State of Georgia (1832), 6 Peters
515, at pp . 542-543:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct
people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest
of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their
own laws. (Emphasis furnished by Hall J.) .
In R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R 1025, at p. 1053, (1990), 70 D.L.R . (4th) 427, at
p. 448, Lamer J. stated for the court :
The mother countries did everything in their power to secure the alliance of each
Indian nation and to encourage nations allied with the enemy to change sides .
When these efforts met with success, they were incorporated in treaties of alliance
or neutrality . This clearly indicates that the Indian nations were regarded in their
relations with the European nations which occupied North America as independent
nations .
5 See, Calder v. Attorney-General ofBritish Columbia, ibid, per Hall J., at pp. 383-385
(S.C.R.), 195-196 (D.L.R.) ; Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, (1984), 13 D.L.R .
(4th) 321, per Dickson J., at pp . 376-379 (S .C.R.), 335-336 (D.L.R .) ; R. v. Sparrow,
[1990] 1 S.C.R . 1075, at p. 1103, (1990), 70 D.L.R . (4th) 385, at p. 404.
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to possess special "aboriginal rights" which, although not the. creation of
the Canadian state, are recognized under the common law of Canada.6
Many First Nations alsô hold "treaty rights" flowing from agreements with
the Crown or between the Crown and other states .? Prior to 1982, these
rights could be abridged or extinguished by statute.$ However, since the
enactment of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, any , Aboriginal
or treaty rights not extinguished before 1982 have enjoyed constitutional
protection and can only be limited by statute when strict standards are
met.9 Finally, under Canadian common law, the Crown owes special
fiduciary or trust-like obligations to First Nations that can be enforced
in the courts ; these obligations have.now been constitutionalized by section
35 . 10
This account represents a significant advance over judicial viewpoints
previously available in Canada or indeed in the United States . Still, it
leaves a number ofimportant issues unexamined or unresolved . For example,
if First ]Nations were once independent, how did they come to lose this
status? To invoke European "discoveries" is to employ ethnocentric criteria
that cannot meet neutral standards of justification ." Further, to rely simply
on conquest or cession ignores the arguments of some Aboriginal groups
that they never were conquered by the Crown or voluntarily accepted
its authority.12 So our first and most basic challenge is to give an account
6 See Calder v . Attorney-General of British Columbia, ibid, per Judson J., at pp.
320-328 (S.C.R.), 150-156 (D.L.R .), per Hall J., at pp. 376-406 (S.C.R.), 190-211 (D.L.R .);
Guerin v. The Queen, ibid, per Dickson J., at pp. 376-379 (S.C.R.), 335-336 (D.L.R .),
per Wilson J ., at pp . 348-349 (S.C.R.), 356 (D.L.R.) ; Roberts v . Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R .
322, at p . 340, (1989), 57 D.L.R . (4th) 197; at p. 210; R. v. Sparrow, ibid, at pp . 1094-
1101 (S.C.R.), 397-403 (D.L.R.) ; R. v. Sioui, supra, footnote 4, at pp . 1055 (S.C.R .),
450 (D.L.R.) .
7 See Simon v . The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R . 387, (1985), 24 D.L.R . (4th) 390; R.
v . Sioui, supra, footnote 4 .
8 See Calder v . Attorney-General ofBritish Columbia, supra, footnote 4, per Judson
J., at pp . 333 (S.C.R.), 159-160 (D.L.R.), per Hall J ., at pp . 402-404 (S.C.R.), 208-
210 (D.L.R .) ; R. v. Derriksan (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 159 (S.C.C .) ; Kruger and Manuel
v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104, at pp . 111-112, 116, (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 434,
at pp . 439, 443 ; Guerin v. The Queen, supra, footnote 5, per Dickson J ., at pp . 376-
377 (S.C.R .), 335 (D.L.R .) .
9 R. v . Sparrow, supra, footnote 5 .
10 See Guerin v. The Queen, supra, footnote 5, per Dickson J ., at pp . 375-389 (S.C.R.),
334-344 (D.L.R.), per Wilson J., at pp. 348-352 (S.C.R .), 356-359 (D.L.R .); R. v . Sparrow,
supra, footnote 5, at pp. 1107-1108 (S.C.R.), 408 (D.L.R.) . For a recent application of
the fiduciary doctrine, see Ontario (A.G.) v. Bear Island Foundation, [1991] 2 S.C.R . 570,
at p. 575, (1991), 83 D.L.R. (4th) 381, at p. 384 .
11 The point is developed in E. Slattery, Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims,
in F. Cassidy (ed.), Aboriginal Self-Determination (1991), pp . 197-217, also printed in
(1991), 29 Osgoode Hall L. J. No. 4 (forthcoming) .
12 Thus, a descendent of the Aboriginal parties to Treaty Number Six recently affirmed
that under the Treaty: "We are bonded with another sovereign nation. We never gave
up our nationhood."; The Globe and Mail, Monday, March 9, 1992, p . A5 .
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of the Canadian Constitution that explains why and to what degree it
is binding on First Nations.13
Even if we assume that First Nations have in some manner come
under the Crown's aegis, a second question arises. Has their original
sovereignty been completely extinguished or does it continue to exist in
some modified form under the protective wing of the Canadian Constitution?
If the latter view is correct, how does Aboriginal sovereignty interact with
Federal and Provincial governmental powers?
Other issues are raised by the existence of a trust-like relationship
between the Crown and First Nations . In R. v. Sparrow,14 the Supreme
Court held:
. . . the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect
to aboriginal peoples . The relationship between the Government and aboriginals
is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation
of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship.
What is the theoretical basis for this holding? Does it, for example, assume
that the Crown stands to Aboriginal peoples as a guardian towards a ward,
on the assumption that Aboriginal peoples are largely incapable of handling
their own affairs?15 Or does the Crown's trust responsibility rest on other
premises, more compatible with the democratic principles informing the
Constitution?
Finally, the Supreme Court has heldthat Aboriginal land rights survived
the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty, but that they could be extinguished
by legislation or voluntary surrender. In large sectors of Canada, notably
in British Columbia and the Atlantic Provinces, there were no land cession
agreements or statutes terminating Aboriginal title in explicit terms. Does
this mean that all lands in these areas are still subject to Aboriginal title,
including lands occupied by private parties? Or did certain generally-worded
statutes quietly strip native peoples of their ancestral homelands, wholesale
and without compensation? Do these stark alternatives exhaust the field,
or is there some intermediate view that upholds the rights of First Nations
without undermining the foundations of the current land system?
Despite their differences, these various questions have a common theme.
They all call into question the basis and character of the Canadian state
and its relationship with First Nations. They all prompt us to think in
fundamental ways about the Constitution and the principles that animate
and sustain it. Unhappily, our traditional stock of constitutional ideas is
13 See M. Asch and P. Macklem, Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An
Essay on R. v. Sparrow (1991), 29 Alta Law Rev. 498.
14 Supra, footnote 5, at pp. 1108 (S.C.R.), 408 (D.L.R.).
Is This was the view expressed by Marshall C.J. of the United States Supreme Court
in Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia (1831), 5 Peters 1, at p. 17, where he characterized
Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" which were "in a state of pupilage", and
stated that their relation to the United States "resembles that of a ward to his guardian".
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of little help here . Unlike the United Kingdom and the United States,
we have no widely-accepted doctrines that account for the origins and
nature of the Constitution and explain its claims on our loyalty. So far
as we have a theory at all, it is one grounded in imperial constitutional
law, which by invoking the ghost of Empire Past raises more problems
than it solves . But if our Constitution is no longer the creature of British
colonial rule, what has it become? Have we converted to the view that
the Constitution is an expression of the will of the Canadian people, who
collectively make up the ultimate sovereign? 16 If so, how can this theory
be reconciled with the corporate claims of First Nations and the Provinces,
which are anti-majoritarian when seen in the larger context, of Canada?
These are complex and difficult issues, which hardly seem to allow
for simple answers. So it may be rash to suggest that the key to a solution
lies close at hand, and in a somewhat unlikely place: the doctrine that
the Crown owes trust-like obligations to native peoples. The search for
an acceptable basis for this doctrine leads, I think, to a better understanding
of the principles that inform our Constitution as a whole and distinguish
it in important ways from the constitutions of other countries.
1. The General Concept of19 Constitutional Trust
The idea that political power is essentially a matter of trust is hardly new.
It has been advanced by thinkers widely separated in time and place, and
has assumed a remarkable variety of forms.17 What is of interest to us
here, however, is that it provides a link between traditional First Nations
philosophies and certain strands of European political thought.
Professor Oren Lyons, a peace-keeper with the Six .Nations, offers
these observations about his people's outlook:18
My people, the Iroquois, were very powerful people . They had a coalition
of forces that was governed by two fires: the spiritual fire and the political fire .
The central fire, ofcourse, was the spiritual fire . The primary law ofIndian government
is the spiritual law. Spirituality is the highest form of politics, and our spirituality
is directly involved in government. As chiefs we are told that our first, and most
important duty is to see that the spiritual ceremonies are carried out. Without the
le. See, for example, Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, at p. 745,
(1985), 19 D.L.R . (4th) 1, at p. 19 : "The Constitution of a country is a statement of
the will ofthe people to be governed in accordance with certainprinciples held as fundamental
and certain prescriptions restrictive of the powers of the legislature and government ."
17 Ranging, for example, from Vaclav Havel's brilliant essay, Politics and Conscience,
in V. Havel, Living in Truth. (J. Vladislav (ed.), 1989), pp . 136-157, especially at pp .
153-154, to the ancient concept of the Mandate of Heavan in Chinese philosophy, as
seen in w:T. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1963), especially pp. 3, 62,
77-78, 92-93.
18 O. Lyons, -Sprituality, Equality, and Natural Law, in L. Little Bear, M. Boldt, and
J.A . Long (eds .), Pathways to Self-Determination: Canadian Indians and the Canadian
State (1984), pp. 5-6.
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ceremonies, one does not have a basis on which to conduct government for the
welfare of the people. This is not only for our people but for the good of all living
things in general . So we are told first to conduct the ceremonies on time, in the
proper manner, and then to sit in council for the welfare of our people and of
all life.
There is another fundamental understanding in Indian government, and it is
that all life is equal. Whether it is the growing life of trees, plants, or animals,
or whether it is human, all life is equal . Furthermore, all human beings, black,
red, yellow, and white, are equal and of the same family . . . . It has been the mandate
ofourpeople to look after the welfare of the land anditslife. Central to this responsibility
is a recognition and respect for the equality of all of the elements of life on this
land .
Among the many ideas broached in this passage, I would like to call
attention to the view that government is a mandate carrying with it the
responsibility to govern for the welfare of the people and indeed of all
life . The people are considered equal, whatever their racial or ethnic origins .
This mandate, as understood among the Iroquois, is basically spiritual in
nature, flowing ultimately from the Creator. 19 It entails the responsibility
to govern not only for the benefit of those living today but more particularly
for the good of future generations.
This last theme permeates a statement issued by a gathering of Native
American elders assembled in Navajo country in 1982:20
Brothers and Sisters the natural law is the final and absolute authority governing
`Etinohah'-the earth we call our mother. . . . We are nourished by our mother-
the earth-from whom all life springs. We must understand our dependence on
her and protect her with our love, respect and ceremonies . The faces of our future
generations are looking up to us from the earth; and we step with great care not
to disturb our grandchildren . . . . The natural law says that the earth belongs to our
children-seven generations into the future-and we are the caretakers who must
understand, respect and protect `Etinohah' for all life.
Again we notice the doctrine that governmental power has inherent limits,
that we are merely caretakers for the benefit of future generations.
In his Second Treatise of Government, published in 1690, the English
philosopher John Locke advanced an influential doctrine of government
19 See "A Declaration of the First Nations" adopted by the Assembly of First Nations
Conference of December 1980 ; reproduced in the Second Report of the Special Committee
on Indian Self-Government in Canada (Chairman: Mr. K. Penner), Canada, House of
Commons, Issue No. 40, October 12, 1983, October 20, 1983, p. 176. This states in
part:
We the Original Peoples of this land know the Creator put us here. The Creator
gave us laws that govern all our relationships to live in harmony with nature and
mankind. The laws of the Creator defined our rights and responsibilities . The Creator
gave us our spiritual beliefs, our languages, our culture, and a place on mother
earth which provided us with all our needs.
Quoted in O. Lyons, Traditional Native Philosophies Relating to Aboriginal Rights,
in M. Boldt andJ. A. Long (eds .), The Quest for Justice : Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal
Rights (1985), p. 21 .
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that, despite basic differences with native American philosophies, has some
interestingpoints of similarity . As is well-known, Locke invokes the concepts
of a state of nature, natural law, human equality, and a social compact.
Less well-known is the fact that he elaborates a basic doctrine - of
governmental trust . The following passages give some flavour of his
approach :21
. . Political Power is that Power which every Man, having in the state of Nature,
has given up into the hands of the Society, and therein to the Governours, whom
the Society hath set over it self, with this express or tacit Trust, That it shall be
imployed for their good, and the preservation of their Property :[221 . . . it can have
no other end or measure, when in the hands of the Magistrate, but to preserve
the Members of that Society in their Lives, Liberties, and Possessions; and so cannot
be an Absolute, Arbitrary Power over their Lives and Fortunes, which are as much
as possible to be preserved; . . . (para. 171)
These are the Founds which the trust that is put in them by the Society, and the
Law of God and Nature, have set to the Legislative Power of every Commonwealth,
in all Forms of Government . First, They are to govern by promulgated establish'd
Laws, not to be varied in particular Cases, but to have one Rule for Rich and
Poor, for the Favorite at Court, and the Country Man at Plough . Secondly, These
Laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the
People. . . . (para. 142)
. . . the Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends, there remains
still in the People a Supream Power to remove or alter the Legislative, when they
find the Legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them. For all Power given
with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end
is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited . . . (para.
149)
Prominent in these passages is the concept that Government is a trust
under which power can only be exercised for the good of the people23
Although in Locke's view the proximate source of the trust is the social
compact, its ultimate basis is the Law of Nature, which Locke identifies
with the will of God as discoverable by reason24 Thus, even if the
controversial notion of a social compact were dropped from Locke's scheme,
there would remain the important idea that political power is subject to
a trust in favour of the citizenry.
These varied theories provide a backdrop against which the thesis
of this article can be assessed. 1 will argue that the Canadian Constitution
is animated by a distinctive doctrine, of constitutional trust, which contrasts
21 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (P . Laslett (ed.), 1965), ~pp . 409, 413,
428-429; passages slightly modernized by the elimination of italics .
22 Note that Locke uses the term "Property" here in the extended sense explained
in para. 87 (ibid), as including a person's "Life, Liberty, and Estate".
23 For helpful discussions, see P. Laslett, Introduction, in Laslett, ibid, pp. 126-130;
and J.W . Gough, John Locke's Political Philosophy (2nd ed ., 1973), pp. 154-192.
24 For Locke's explanation of these points, see especially paras . 6 and 135, op. cit.,
footnote 21, pp. 311, 402-403.
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on the one hand with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty prevailing
in the United Kingdom, and on the other with American ideas of popular
sovereignty and individual rights . While this doctrine of trust has certain
affinities with Aboriginal themes, and in other respects resembles some
of Locke's ideas, it has a particular character of its own, shaped by the
communitarian and pluralist forces of Canadian history.
In making this argument, I do not mean to suggest that the Canadian
Constitution was designed to embody the doctrine of trust, or even that
the notion has featured conspicuously in our constitutional discourse . I
only say that the manner in which we have actually carried on our
constitutional affairs strongly evinces the concept of a trust, whatever our
declared intentions: that is, the concept is tacitly embedded in the law
and practice of the Canadian Constitution and has the power to illuminate
and explain a number of its basic traits .25
11 . Trust as the Root of the Canadian Constitution
As we all know, Canada has an entrenched Constitution, which is paramount
to ordinary laws and governmental bodies and cannot be amended by
simple statute. This is such an obvious feature of our public law that we
rarely pause to consider its origins and basis . Surprisingly, these are not
at all clear. Nothing directly comparable is found in modern British
constitutional law, the source of many of our basic doctrines . While the
concept that Parliament was bound by fundamental law hadsome currency
in England as late as the 17th century, it gave way during the 18th century
to the modern doctrine ofparliamentary supremacy.26 As part ofthis doctrine,
it was held that Parliament had the ability to change any part of the
British Constitution by ordinary statute, including some of the Constitution's
most ancient and distinctive features, and to enact laws affecting the
fundamental rights and liberties of the people .27
The fledgling British colonies in North America inherited the notion
of parliamentary sovereignty, but they did so only in a modified form .
While local colonial legislatures were recognized as sovereign within their
spheres, it was held that those spheres were, in general, limited by the
terms of the Constitutions granted by the Imperial Parliament . Moreover,
Imperial statutes extending to the colonies were taken to override any
25 See the approach in Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra, footnote 16, at pp. 750-
752 (S.C .R .), 23-25 (D.L.R.), where the court concluded that it might give effect to what
it termed "unwritten postulates which form the very foundation of the Constitution of
Canada".
26 Compare, for example, the accounts in C.H . Mcllwain, The High Court ofParliament
(1910), and J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (1961) .
21 For a classic discussion, see, H.W.R. Wade, The Basis ofLegal Sovereignty (1955),
13 Camb . L.J. 172.
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conflicting colonial laws and to be immune to local repeal 38 So, in practice,
Canadian lawyers became familiar with the concept of a higher law, in
the form of limits imposed by the Westminster Parliament .
This trend was reinforced at Confederation, with the passage of the
)British North America Act, 1 867 by the Imperial Parliament29 The
paramountcy of Westminster accounted for the supremacy attributed to
this Act and its successors, and provided courts with the rationale for
striking down local statutes that conflicted with its terms.3° TheAct's division
of governmental powers between Federal and Provincial authorities greatly
increased the need for such judicial supervision and further imprinted the
notion of limited government in the Canadian consciousness.
Canada's rise to independence and the termination of Westminster's
authority have long since deprived the Constitution of its original foun-
dation.31 If British power once provided the rationale for the Constitution's
supremacy, it no longer can; yeti nothing seems to have replaced it. To
all appearances, the Constitution is suspended . in mid-air like a levitating
saint, sustained by faith alone.
Despite this odd spectacle, the doctrine of constitutional supremacy
has remained unchallenged in Canada and indeed has moved from strength
to strength with the advent of the Charter of Nights and Freedoms .32
Somehow, without benefit of deliberate cultivation, the concept of fun-
damental law has grown deep roots in Canadian soil. As a matter of current
law, it is clearly beyond the power of any Canadian legislature to repeal
or amend the entrenched portions of the Constitution . These can only
be altered by the concurrent action of various governmental bodies, according
to a complicated amending formula embodied in the Constitution Act,
1982.33
Put if we are curious enough to inquire why the amending formula
is binding, no clear answer is forthcoming. Is it, perhaps, because the formula
was approved in 1982 by a majority of Canadians acting through their
Federal representatives, on the theory that the Constitution gains its validity
from popular consent? If this is the true explanation, it is peculiar that
28 See Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28-29 Vict ., c . 63 (U.K.), ss . 2-5, and
discussion in K. Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (1966), pp. 139-140,
396-405 . See also B . Slattery, The Independence of Canada (1983), 5 Sup. Ct. Law Rev.
369, at pp. 384-390, and references given there .
29 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), now renamed the Constitution Act, 1867.
30 See Slattery, loc. cit., footnote 28 .
31 "There can be no doubt nowthat Canada has become asovereign state . Its sovereignty
was acquired in the period between its separate signature of the Treaty of Versailles in
1919 and the Statute of Westminster, 1931 . . ."; Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British
Columbia, [1967] S.C.R. 792, at p. 816, (1967), 65 I .L.R. (2d) 353, at p. 375.
32 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra, footnote 3 .
33 Ibid, sections 38-49 .
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the amending formula cannot now be by-passed by a majority vote in
the Federal Parliament or a national referendum . Again, we maybe puzzled
by the prominent roles actually played by the Provinces in the 1982
constitutional process34 and the memorable curtain-call of the British
Parliament . These suggest that majority consent was not the only con-
sideration and that certain historical and structural factors ultimately held
sway . So, a different explanation has some appeal. This holds that the
current amending formula is binding simply because it was approved by
the authorities designated by the old formula inherited from imperial times.35
However, this response raises troubling questions about the legitimacy of
the Canadian state, insofar as it portrays the Constitution as grounded
ultimately in the old imperial arrangements, arguably born in conquest
and coercion .
The view proposed here is that, whatever its historical origins, the
modern Canadian Constitution owes its supremacy to the existence of a
fundamental trust that molds and informs our governmental institutions .
At the most abstract level, the trust embodies the fundamental doctrine
that governments do not possess unlimited powers but are constrained
by their intrinsic mandate, which is to govern for the welfare of the people,
both those now living and those to be born . But this doctrine, which is
hardly unique to Canada, does not take effect in the abstract . It operates
only within a particular social context, which is shaped by a community's
particular historical experiences and its on-going legal and political structures .
In its distinctive Canadian incarnation, the doctrine holds that the govern-
mental trust is owed not just to individual citizens but also to various
communities represented in our confederal structure, to wit the Provinces,
the First Nations, and Canada as a whole.
On this view, the division of powers between the Federal Government
and the Provinces constitutes a fiduciary structure under which regional
communities are guaranteed a large degree of autonomy over their own
affairs, without the possibility of outside interference. By the same token,
the structure embodies a commitment to the larger community of Canada
that its transcending interests will not be the prisoner of regional outlooks
but will be furthered by Parliament .36 The amending formula secures the
34 According to the Supreme Court's ruling in Re Resolution to Amendthe Constitution,
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1, a substantial measure of provincial
concurrence was required by constitutional convention but not by law.
35 This was the approach attempted in Slattery, loc. cit., footnote 28 . For other views
and discussion, see P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd ed ., 1985), pp . 44-49.
36 This basic outlookis reflectedin aclassic statement bythe Privy Council inLiquidators
of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick, [1892] A.C .
437, at pp . 441-442: "The object of the [Constitution Act, 1867] was neither to weld
the provinces into one, nor to subordinate provincial governments to a central authority,
but to create a federal government in which they should all be represented, entrusted
with the exclusive administration of affairs in which they had a common interest, each
province retaining its independence and autonomy." (Emphasis added).
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Provinces in their prerogatives and rules out encroachments on their spheres
without their acquiescence;37 at the same time, it ensures that the sphere
of Federal responsibility will not be diminished without Federal consent .
ut the division of powers is not the only collective manifestation
of the constitutional trust. 1 suggest that the Constitution incorporates a
particular fiduciary relationship with the province of Quebec. This rela
tionship is grounded in various historical acts and practices that cumulatively
have recognized the right of the largely francophone community of Quebec
to retain its distinctive laws, religion, language, and culture, and to live
under a separate government with powers sufficient to sustain the society's
unique character. The most prominent landmarks in this evolving rela-
tionship are the Quebec Act of 1774,38 the Constitutional Act of 1791,39
the Constitution Act, 1867, and parts of the Constitution Act, 1982.
However, these Acts are merely signposts along a network of well-worn
constitutional pathways that have contributed to the formation of certain
common law doctrines . ®n this view, a constitutional amendment rec-
ognizing explicitly the distinct status of Quebec (as is currently proposed)
wouldonly carry to its natural conclusion a doctrine already deeplyingrained
in the fibre of the Constitution.40
The third collective facet of the Canadian constitutional trust is the
special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples,
recognized by the Supreme Court4 1 This relationship is grounded in historical
practices that emerged from dealings between the British Crown and
Aboriginal nations in eastern North America, especially during the formative
period extending from the founding of colonies in the early 1600s to the
38 14 Geo . III, c . 83 (U.K .).
3s 31 Geo . III, c . 31 (U.K.).
37 Thus, while section 38(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 allows certain constitutional
amendments to the made with the assent of only two-thirds of the Provinces with fifty
per cent of the total population, s . 38(3) allows a Province to opt out of any amendment
under s . 38 that derogates from its powers or rights.
4° See Government of Canada, Shaping Canada's Future Together: Proposals (1991);
andParliament ofCanada, Special Joint Committee ofthe Senate and the HouseofCommons,
Final Report : A Renewed Canada (1992) (Co-chairs : G. Beaudoin and D. Dobbie).
41 See cases cited supra, footnote 10 . For commentary, see : R.H. Bartlett, You Can't
Trust the Crown : The Fiduciary Obligation of the Crown to the Indians : Guerin v . The
Queen (1984-85), 49 Sask . L. Rev. 367 ; R.H . Bartlett, The Fiduciary Obligation of the
Crown to the Indians (1989), 53 Sask. L . Rev . 301 ; M.A. Donohue, Aboriginal Land
Rights in Canada : AHistorical Perspective on the Fiduciary Relationship (1990),15 American
Indian L. Rev . 369 ; D.P. Emond, Case Comment : Guerin v . R. (1986), 20 Estates and
Trusts Reports 61 ; J. Hurley, The Crown's Fiduciary Duty and Indian Title. Guerin v.
The Queen (1985), 30 McGill Law J . 559; D . Johnston, A Theory of Crown Trust Towards
Aboriginal Peoples (1986), 18 Ottawa L. Rev . 307; W.R . McMurtry and A. Pratt, Indians
and the Fiduciary Concept, Self-Government and the Constitution; Guerin in Perspective,
[1986] 3 C.hi.L .R . 19 ; J.1. Reynolds and L.F. Harvey, The Fiduciary Obligation of the
United States and Canadian Governments Towards Indian Peoples (1985) .
272
	
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [Vol . 71
fall of New France in 1760.42 By the end of this period, the principles
underlying these practices had crystallized as part of the basic constitutional
law governing the colonies, and were reflected in the Royal Proclamation
issued by the British Crown on October 7, 176343
The Proclamation evokes the complex nature of the trust relationship
in a series of shaded contrasts:44
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest and the Security
of Our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom We
are connected, and who live under Our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed
in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having
been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their
Hunting Grounds;
Notice the subtle apposition of justice with regal self-interest, Aboriginal
autonomy with British suzerainty, Indian land rights with the Crown's
territorial title, and protective measures with procedures for purchase . The
overall effect is to affirm both the powers and the attendent responsibilities
of the Crown relative to Aboriginal nations, as quasi-sovereign entities
living under the Crown's protection.
Upon Canada's emergence from colonial rule, the legal principles
governing the trust relationship became part of the common law of Canada,
shorn of any inappropriate imperial features . 45 The process of internal
decolonization was carried to a further stage in 1982, with the guarantee
of Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 .46
The most important effect of this provision was to entrench the trust
relationship with Aboriginal peoples and put it on a more contemporary
42 On the historical basis of the relationship, see Guerin v. The Queen, supra, footnote
5, per Dickson J., at pp . 383-384, 387 (S.C.R.), 340, 343 (D.L.R.), per Wilson J., at
pp . 348-349 (S .C.R.), 356-357 (D.L.R .) ; R. v. Sparrow, supra, footnote 5, at pp. 1107
1108 (S.C.R .), 408 (D.L.R .) ; Mitchell v. Feguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R . 85, (1990),
71 D.L.R . (4th) 193, per Dickson C.J .C ., at pp. 108-109 (S .C .R .), 209 (D.L.R.), per
La Forest J., at pp. 129-131 (S .C .R .), 225-226 (D.L.R.).
43 The most accurate printed text of the Proclamation is found in C.S . Brigham (ed.),
British Royal Proclamations Relating to America (1911), p. 212, quoted here. A less accurate
but more accessible version is found in R.S.C . 1985, Appendix II, No . 1 . The original
text, entered on the Patent Roll for the regnal year 4 Geo. III, is located in the United
Kingdom Public Record Office: c. 66/3693 (back of roll).
44 Brigham, ibid, p. 215. This preamble is one of several punctuating the text; it
leads off the provisions devoted specifically to Aboriginal peoples .
45 See Roberts v. Canada,supra, footnote 6, at pp . 338-340 (S.C.R.), 209-210 (D.L.R.) ;
and discussion in J.M. Evans and B. Slattery, Case Comment: Roberts v. Canada (1989),
68 Can. Bar. Rev. 817, at pp. 830-832. For the transition from imperial law to Canadian
common law, see B. Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights (1987), 66 Can. Bar Rev.
727, at pp. 736-741, 753-755; and Slattery, loc. cit., footnote 28, at pp . 392-393.
46 Section 35(1) provides : "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed." Section 35(2) explains that the
term "aboriginal peoples" includes "the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples".
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and democratic footing.47 As such, the provision affords protection to
Aboriginal land rights, laws, and powers of self-government, and perhaps
also Aboriginal languages and cultures 48
The Aboriginal trust relationship is collective in nature . The Crown's
fiduciary obligations are owed to Aboriginal nations as corporate entities,
even if the individual members of the nations are also affected . This collective
aspect ofthe relationship puts it on a par with the trust relationship implicit
in the federal structure, whereby the provinces enjoy certain powers and
rights as collective entities considered apart from their citizens .
This analogy suggests a further point. From the legal perspective,
boriginal nations are constitutional entities rather than ethnic or racial
groups . Althougha First Nation, like a province, mayhappen to be composed
mainly of people of a certain stock, its status does not stem from its racial
or ethnic make-up but from its political autonomy . Just as there is no
reason why a person- of Irish or Chinese descent cannot be a Quebecois,
there is no reason why someone of French origins cannot belong to a
First Nation . Indeed, traditionally, most First Nations have had methods
of admitting outsiders, through adoption, marriage, long-standing residence,
or other processes . That an Aboriginal nation is made up of peoples of
mixed and varied origins or has evolved a pluralistic lifestyle does not
make it any less Aboriginal49 This said, it is clear that a First Nation
may have a 'legitimate constitutional interest in controlling its own mem-
bership to ensure the perpetuation ofits social identity, culture, andlanguage.
47 See R. v. Sparrow, supra, footnote 5, at pp . 1107-1109, 1114 (S.C.R .), 408-409,
413 (D.L.R .) . The court' observes, at pp. 1093 (S.C.R .), 397 (D.L.R.), that "the phrase
`existing aboriginal rights' must be interpreted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over
time . . .,-the word `existing' suggests that those rights are `affirmed in a contemporary
form rather than in their primeval simplicity and vigour"'.
4s For a spectrum of views on section 35, see: W.I .C . Binnie, The Sparrow Doctrine :
Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning? (1990), 15 Queen's Law J. 217 ; ht . Lyon,
An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation (1988), 26 Osgoode Hall L.J . 95; K . Lysyk,
The Rights and Freedoms of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, in W.S . Tarnopolsky
and G.A. Beaudoin (eds .), The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), 467;
K . Mchleil, The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada (1982), 4 Sup .
Ct . Law Rev . 255; K . McNeil, The Constitution Act, 1982, Sections 25 and 35, [19881
1 C.N.L.R.1; W. Pentney, The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples ofCanada in the Constitution
Act, 1982. Part II . Section 35 : The Substantive Guarantee (1988), 22 U.B.C . Law Rev.
207 ; D . Sanders, The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada (1983), 61 Can. Bar
Rev . 314; D . Sanders, Pre-existing Rights : The Aboriginal Peoples of Canada (Sections
25 and 35), in G.A . Beaudoin and E . Ratushny (eds .), The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (2nd ed.,1989), p . 707; B. Slattery; The Constitutional Guarantee ofAboriginal
and Treaty Rights (1982-83), 8 Queen's Law J. 232 ; B . Slattery, The Hidden Constitution :
Aboriginal Rights in Canada (1984), 32 American Journal - of Comparative Law 361 ;
Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, loc. cit, footnote 45 ; B. Slattery, Aboriginal
Language Rights, in D . Schneiderman (ed.), Language and the State (1991), 369 .
49 See further, Slattery, The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights,
ibid., at pp. 269-270 .
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By contrast, the goal of maintaining a Nation's supposed racial character
can hardly be defended.50
A second cluster of points emerges from these observations . The trust
relationship affects individual people only insofar as they are members
of an Aboriginal nation, and then only in their capacity as members. Thus,
the fact that individuals are genetically akin to members of an Aboriginal
nation or have a similar lifestyle does not necessarily mean that they belong
to that nation ; the question turns on the nation's membership criteria. Again,
members of Aboriginal nations are also Canadian citizens, and in certain
contexts have rights and duties identical to those of other Canadians. So,
the trust relationship does not colour all their dealings with the Crown,
whether conducted on an individual or a communal basis.51
The trust relationship attaches primarily to the Federal government,
but it also affects Provincial governments in certain contexts . Prior to
Confederation, the Crown was bound in its capacity as head of the various
colonies and territories making up British North America. Therearrangement
of constitutional powers and rights accomplished at Confederation did not
reduce the Crown's overall fiduciary obligations to First Nations. Rather,
these obligations tracked the various powers and rights to their destinations
in Ottawa and the Provincial capitals . Since section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 makes the Federal government responsible for
"Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians", the main burden of the
trust relationship clearly falls on its shoulders. However, so long as the
Provinces have powers and rights enabling them to affect adversely
Aboriginal interests protected by the relationship, they hold attendant
fiduciary obligations.52
For example, we know that promises made by the Crown to secure
the surrender of Aboriginal lands give rise to particular fiduciary obligations
that supplement the general trust relationship 53 We also know that such
land surrenders, even though made to the Federal government, enure to
50 See the pertinent issues raised by Lise Bissonnette in the article entitled "Question
aux premiers peuples" ; Le Devoir, 16 March 1992 .
51 See the thoughtful observations of La Forest J. in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band,
supra, footnote 42, at pp . 127-147 (S.C.R.), 223-239 (D.L.R .) .
52 See the remarks of Dickson C.J.C . in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, ibid., at
pp . 108-109 (S .C.R.), 209-10 (D.L.R .); La Forest J.'s comment that the "provincial Crowns
bear no responsibility to provide for the welfare and protection of native peoples" (at
pp . 143 (S .C.R.), 237 (D.L.R .)) should be read, I think, as emphasizing the exclusive
responsibilities of the Federal government for native peoples under section 91(24), without
ruling out the possibility of incidental Provincial responsibilities arising from Provincial
powers in other areas.
53 Guerin v. The Queen, supra, footnote 5; Ontario (A.G.) v. Bear IslandFoundation,
supra, footnote 10. These decisions reverse the view expressed by the Privy Council in
A.-G. for Canada v. A.-G. for Ontario, [1897] A.C. 199, at p. 213.
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the benefit of the Province concerned under section 109 of the 1867 Act54
Where the benefiting Province has the exclusive constitutional authority
to fulfill the Crown's promises, it cannot take the benefit of the surrender
without incurring corresponding fiduciary obligations. Thus, if the Federal
Crown has undertaken to set aside reserves out of the lands surrendered,
this promise binds the Province to which the lands pass, because it alone
has the power to carry out the promise.5s It follows that a Province may
refuse to accept the benefit of an Aboriginal surrender if .it is unwilling
to incur the accompanying obligations .
Viewed in this perspective, the Crown's relationship with native peoples
differs significantly from the guardian-ward relationship known to private
law. Indeed analogies with the, private law governing trusts and fiduciary
obligations are not always helpful in this context.5 6 Thesame caution applies
to concepts of international trusteeship, as embodied in the' League . of
Nations' Mandate System and the United Nations' Trusteeship System .
The Canadian Crown's fiduciary relationship with First Nations is a
particular instance of the Crown's overall trust responsibilities to the peoples
of Canada, which are woven into our constitutional traditions . Whereas
both the private law of guardianship and the international trusteeship system
assume the incapacity of individuals and nations to manage their own
affairs, the Crown's fiduciary relationship with First Nations presupposes
the inherent capacity of the latter to govern themselves. Further, it entails
a duty to respect and protect native powers of self-government within
Canada . We will return to this subject later in the article.
The collective obligations implicit in Canada's confederal structure
make up only one aspect of Canada's constitutional trust . The Crown
also has fiduciary obligations to private individuals, as embodied in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . Although the Charter is mostly
worded in terms of rights, its actual effect is to impose a range of duties
on various governmental institutions, including legislatures, executive bodies,
andthe courts . These duties are fiduciary in the sense that they are grounded
in a relationship of trust between government and citizenry, under which
the former's powers are conditioned by the duty to respect vital elements
of a citizen's personal dignity and well-being, such as freedom of thought
sq St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C .) .
Section 109 provides that all lands belonging to the several Provinces at the time of
Confederation shall continue to belong to them "subject to any Trusts existing in respect
thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the Province in the same" .
55 On the latter point, see Ontario Mining Co. v. Seybold, [1903] A.C. 73 (P.C .) .
56 As Dickson J. emphasized in Guerin v. The Queen, supra, footnote 5, at pp . 387
(S.C.R .), 343 (D.L.R .) : ". . . the- fiduciary obligation which is owed to the Indians by the
Crown is sui generis. Given the unique character both of the Indians' interest in land
and of their historical relationship with the Crown, the fact that this is so should occasion
no surprise." See also the comments of Strayer J . in Alexander Band No. 134 v . Canada,
[1991] 2 F.C . 3, at pp. 15-17 (F.C.T.D.) .
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and security of the person, and to maintain proper conditions for a person's
relationships with others, as through equality under the law and freedom
of association.
As such, the Charter should not be understood as directed exclusively
at the courts . The judiciary, of course, has an important role to play in
the interpretation and enforcement of the Charter. But to concentrate on
that aspect is to view the Charter in a distorted perspective, not unlike
viewing the Criminal Code as aimed only at judges . The concept of a
constitutional trust suggests that the various institutions of government have
coordinate and overlapping functions in implementing the obligations
recognized in the Charter. The provisions allowing for reasonable limits
and notwithstanding clauses should both be interpreted in this context,
not as escape-routes for legislatures looking to evade their Charter ob-
ligations, but as avenues for fulfilling their constitutional mandates57
III. Some Special Features of the Trust
The doctrine of constitutional trust envisioned here has several distinctive
attributes . By contrast with theories of a social contract, the doctrine does
not maintain that our governmental institutions sprang historically or even
notionally from the consent of the peoples concerned, whether these be
First Nations, French-Canadians, or the general run of citizens . Neither
does it hold that the current legitimacy of these institutions depends on
continuing popular consent, whether tacit or explicit, communal or in-
dividual. Although moments of popular consent can of course be identified
in our history (as well as moments of coercion and intimidation), I suggest
that the legitimacy of our Constitution is grounded primarily in our factual
and moral interdependency as members of Canadian society, as this has
evolved historically, and depends on the degree to which the Constitution
reflects overall just arrangements, given our history.$$
We are born with a range of socially-based rights and duties that
we have neither earned nor voluntarily assumed. Many of these rights
and duties cannot be shed unilaterally, by simple acts of the will. Moreover,
they multiply and intensify as we grow to maturity and take on a broader
range of social roles. Among them are obligations owed to family, spouses,
children, neighbours, co-workers, and other members of society generally.
But they also include the duty to respect and support existing communal
institutions carrying authority within our society, including institutions of
government .
57 These points are developed in B. Slattery, A Theory of the Charter (1987), 25
Osgoode Hall Law J. 701.
58 For various views on this topic, see : A. MacIntre, After Virtue : A Study in Moral
Theory (2nd ed., 1984); J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980); L. Green,
The Authority of the State (1990).
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All these duties have built-in limits . As children we should, of course,
obey our parents; but that duty gives out when parents become abusive.
As members of society, we owe basic duties of respect and forbearance
to other individuals; but we do not have to suffer passively a murderous
assault. Likewise, we should generally obey laws enacted by governmental
authorities actually in place; but those authorities are bound by trust-like
obligations which, if violated in a fundamental . way, may invalidate
governmental .acts or release us from our duty to comply. What is true
of individuals holds for communities. If, for example, the state inflicts some
basic injustice on a particular ethnic community, it may negate the trust
relationship and justify the community in exercising a right of self-
determination .
So, on this view, the legitimacy of the Constitution is a function of
various complex considerations, including our factual and moral interde-
pendency as , members of an on-going society, the need for communal
institutions of decision-making, the existence of governmental institutions
historically adapted to our particular situation, and the justice of the
arrangements these institutions embody. In particular, the Constitution's
legitimacy (or lack thereof) rests on the degree of . respect shown for the
fiduciary obligations that these factors give rise to .
The doctrine of trust has a second distinctive feature. 1t posits an
evolving constitutional relationship or series ofrelationships, whose incidents
change anddevelop over time, blending incremental adaption with conscious
reform.s9 The meaning of the Constitution, on this view, lies as much in
custom and practice as it does in historical intentions, so that the "original
meaning" of a constitutional document (assuming such a thing can exist)
is not necessarily its current meaning. By contrast, social contract theories
tend to envision a fixed constitutional structure whose features are defined
by the terms of the original agreement. From the strict contractarian
perspective, the only way of changing the Consitution is to amend the
agreement ; any other mode ofchange, such as practice,judicial interpretation,
or common understanding, is illegitimate . So, the search for "original
meaning" has an importance in contractarian thought that it lacks under
the theory of a constitutional trust, which allows for incremental adaption
and change.
Finally, the trust doctrine argues that governmental authority is
inherently conditioned and shaped by responsibilities towards the com-
s9 This is consistent with the judiciary's basic approach to the Constitution. As stated
in Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C . 124, at p.'136 (P.C .) : "The
British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion
within its natural limits . The object of the Act was to grant a Constitution to Canada.
`Like all written constitutions it has been subject to development through usage and
convention. . . . . . See also R. v. Sparrow, quoted supra, footnote 47. For discussion and
references, see 13ogg, op. cit., footnote 35, pp. 340-341-.
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munities and individuals governed ; that is to say, government is intrinsically
a matter of trust, regardless of its specific origins, character, or underlying
philosophy. By contrast, strict contractarianism allows for the possibility
of unlimited governmental power, so long as this flows from the original
agreement60 Just as, on one view, individuals in desperate straits can sell
themselves into slavery, so also, according to contractarian logic, nations
can deliver themselves into the hands of an omnipotent sovereign . The
doctrine of constitutional trust runs counter to any such idea . It argues
that the rationale of all governmental institutions is to advance communal
and individual welfare; this rationale poses basic limits on governmental
powers, no matter how these powers originated historically.
So, the doctrine of trust rejects the concept ofan omnipotent Parliament,
which, in any case, has no deep roots in local Canadian traditions. As
seen earlier, Canadian legislatures have never possessed unqualified powers,
but have always operated within the spheres defined by their Constitutions .
The sole institution once thought to possess unlimited power over Canada
was the Imperial Parliament . The power of Westminster in relation to
Canada is now defunct, as is the rationale that once lent it a patina of
credibility: the desire to control distant colonial peoples and safeguard basic
British interests . The doctrine of the omnipotence of Parliament should
be recognized for what it was: the child of a marriage of convenience
between parliamentary self-aggrandizement and imperial ambition, sanc-
tified by legal positivism . Whatever its continued currency in the United
Kingdom, it has no legitimate place in contemporary Canadian constitutional
thought.
IV . The Governmental Powers ofFirst Nations
As noted earlier, the complex process by which the Crown gained authority
over Canadian territories did not terminate the Aboriginal rights of First
Nations, which continued to exist under the common law of Canada .61
Prominent among these rights, I suggest, is the Aboriginal right of self-
government. This view is supported by R. v. Sioui,6z where the Supreme
Court cited a passage from Worcester v. Georgia,63 summarizing British
practice in North America prior to the American Revolution :
60 Of course, some contractarian theorists, such as John Locke, reject this notion.
61 See authorities cited supra, in footnote 6.
62 Supra, footnote 4, at pp . 1054 (S.C.R.), 449 (D.L.R.) ; see also pp . 1055 (S.C.R .),
450 (D.L.R.), where Lamer J. states : "The British Crown recognized that the Indians had
certain ownership rights over their land. . . . It also allowed them autonomy in their internal
affairs, intervening in this area as little as possible."
63 Supra, footnote 4, at pp. 548-549. (Emphasis supplied by Lamer J.) . The author
of the decision, Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, was surveying
British practice throughout its asserted North American dominions, including the Canadian
territories covered by the Royal Proclamation, 1763, cited at p. 548.
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Such was the policy of Great Britain towards the Indian nations inhabiting
the territory from which she excluded all other Europeans ; such her claims, and
such her practical exposition of the charters she had granted : she considered them
as nations capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of governing
themselves, under her protection, and she made treaties with them the obligation
of which she acknowledged.
n this view, Aboriginal peoples became autonomous nations living under
the Crown's protection, exercising powers ofself-government within a larger
constitutional structure partially generated by joint British and Aboriginal
practice.
The Aboriginal right of self-government was originally subject to
Federal jurisdiction under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.64
Over the years, the right was whittled away by the provisions of the Indian
Act. However; it seems the right of self-government as such was never
extinguished . The important consequence is that, when section 35 of the
Constitution , Act, 1982 took effect, the right of self-government was still
extant and featured among the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights"
recognized in the section.65
According to the Supreme Court's ruling in R. v. Sparrow,66 any
legislative limitations on section 35 rights, whether enacted before 1982
or subsequently, are invalid unless they meet a rigorous constitutional
standard. This means that native peoples have the current right to set up
governmental institutions to manage their own affairs, and prima facie
are not limited in this respect by the provisions of Federal statutes such
as the Indian . Act, except where these provisions meet the Sparrow
standard .
64 This gives Parliament the power to legislate with respect to "Indians, and Lands
reserved for the Indians".
65 For background, see M. Asch, Home and Native Land : Aboriginal Rights and
the Canadian Constitution (1984) ; D . Ginn, Aboriginal Self-Government (LL.M. Thesis,
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1987); J.D . Hurley, Children or Brethren :
Aboriginal Rights in Colonial Iroquoia (Doctoral Dissertation, Cambridge University, 1985 ;
reprinted, University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1985) ; D . M . Johnston, The
Quest of the Six Nations Confederacy for Self-Determination (1986), 44 U.T. Faculty
of Law Rev . 1 ; R. Kapashesit and M. Klippenstein, Aboriginal Group Rights and
Environmental Protection (1991), 36 McGill L.J . 925; Little Bear, Boldt, and Long, op.
cit, footnote 18 ; P. Macklem, First Nations Self-Government and theBorders ofthe Canadian
Legal Imagination (1991), 36 McGill Law J. 382; S . Nakatsuru, A . Constitutional Right
of Indian Self-Government (1985), 43 U.T. Faculty of Law Rev. 72 ; B . Ryder, The Demise
and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism; Promoting Autonomy for
the Provinces and First Nations (1991), 36 McGill L.J. 308 ; D. Sanders, Aboriginal Self-
Government in the United States (1985) ; P. Williams, The Chain (LLM : Thesis, Osgoode
Hall Law School, York University, 1982); J.D . whyte, Indian Self-Government : A Legal
Analysis, in Little Bear, Boldt, and Long, op. cit., footnote 18 ; J. Woodward, Native Law
(1989), pp . 81-83 .
16 Supra, footnote 5.
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What in practice does this amount to? The courts have yet to begin
exploring the subject in a serious manner, and ongoing constitutional
discussions have so far failed to yield concrete clarifications . Nevertheless,
I think that the main outlines of the subject are reasonably clear, even
if the detail requires elaboration.
At the start, it is useful to distinguish three separate questions, which
can easily be confused.61 First, is the Aboriginal right of self-government
recognized in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 to be regarded
as derivative or inherent? In the former case, the right is viewed as the
creature of the constitutional provision and merely "granted" to Aboriginal
peoples. If the provision did not exist, neither would the right of self-
government . By contrast, on the second view the right of self-government
is regarded as originating, not from the constitutional provision itself, but
from sources within the communities affected, under customary law,
common law, or natural law. On this view, the constitutional provision
serves merely to recognize, delimit, and protect the right, rather than create
it .
Second, should the constitutional right of self-government be char-
acterized as limited in scope or unlimited? On the first view, there are
fixed constitutional limits to the powers that Aboriginal governments may
exercise, parallel to those that circumscribe the powers of the Federal and
Provincial governments under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act,
1867 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . On the second
view, there are no fixed constitutional limits to the powers of Aboriginal
governments, so that in theory they may act in any area they choose,
including, for example, international relations, defence, external trade, and
so on. Moreover, they would not be subject to constitutional restraints
such as those found in the Charter.
Third, is the constitutional right of self-government subordinate within
its sphere to the powers of other governments, or is it supreme within
its sphere? In the former case, the powers of an Aboriginal government
are subordinate to those of another body, such as a Provincial legislature
or the Federal Parliament, so that laws enacted by an Aboriginal government
are always liable to be overridden or nullified. This status would be
comparable to that held, for example, by Municipal governments vis-à-
vis Provincial legislatures, or by Territorial governments vis-à-vis the Federal
Parliament . By contrast, on the second view, an Aboriginal government
has the power to legislate within a certain sphere without the possibility
of being overruled by any other level of government, whether Federal
67 The following section draws in part upon an analysis originally prepared for the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. I am grateful to the Commission for permission
to use it here .
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or Provincial. This status would be comparable to that held - in practice
by Provincial legislatures .
These issues speak to three subjects, namely: (1) the origins of the
right of self-government; (2) the scope or extent of the right; and (3) the
exclusivity of the right. It is important to note that these are quite distinct
issues, so that our response to one does not necessarily determine our
response to any other. For example, it would be possible for a right of
self-government to be inherent, and yet to operate only within certain
fixed limits, and indeed to be subordinate to the powers of another
governmental body. The fact that a right arises from within a community,
rather than being granted by a superior level of government, does not
necessarily mean that the right is unlimited in scope or that it is free from
all external interference . For example, in United Mates law, Indian
governments are thought to possess inherent powers and yet to exercise
them only within certain limits and subject to the overriding power of
Congress68 .
Keeping these three issues in mind ; let us now consider the nature
of the Aboriginal right of self-government under section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1932. First, it emerges from what we have already said -
that the right is inherent, in the sense that it originates from within Aboriginal
communities as a residue of the powers they originally held as independent
nations prior to European settlement . It does not stem from Constitutional
grant; that is, it is not a derivative or created right. Nevertheless, the right
of self-government is recognized within the Canadian legal system, both
under the common law of Canada' and section 35 of the Constitution.
So, while the right is inherent in point of origin, as a matter of current
status it is a right held under Canadian law and enforceable in the ordinary
courts .
The implication is that, while Aboriginal peoples have the inherent
legal right to govern themselves, this right can only be exercised within
the basic framework of Canadian Confederation. It does not warrant a
claim to unlimited governmental powers or to complete sovereignty, such
as independent states are commonly thought to possess.69 Rather, Aboriginal
governments are in the same position as the Federal and Provincial
governments: their powers are limitedto a sphere defined by the Constitution .
Within that sphere, however, I suggest that Aboriginal governments
possess supreme authority . That is, legislation enacted by such governments
within their acknowledged constitutional arena is not subject to indis-
68 See the discussion in F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed.),
pp . 207-279.
69 Of course, on the view presented earlier, "sovereign" states do not possess unlimited
powers of government ; they are subject to the constraints imposed by the constitutional
trust .
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criminate Federal or Provincial override . How extensive, then, is the sphere
of Aboriginal governmental power and how precisely does it interact with
the powers of the Federal and Provincial governments?
The matter can be summarized in four basic principles . First, the
Aboriginal sphere of authority under section 35 is co-extensive with the
Federal head of power recognized in section 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867 . Second, within this sphere, Aboriginal governments and the
Federal government have concurrent legislative powers. Third, in the case
of conflict between Aboriginal laws and Federal legislation enacted under
section 91, valid Aboriginal laws (including customary laws) will take
precedence, except where the Federal laws can be justified under the section
35 standard laid down in the Sparrow case. Fourth, relative to Provincial
laws, Aboriginal laws have basically the same status as Federal laws enacted
under section 91(24), under the standard rules developed by the courts
to police the Constitutional division of powers .
Let me explain how these principles have been arrived at and what
they entail . Ifsection 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes an inherent
right of self-government, several things follow . First, it is reasonable to
infer that Aboriginal jurisdiction must extend at a minimum to Aboriginal
peoples and their territories . However, this sphere of authority overlaps
with the Federal power to legislate for "Indians, and Lands reserved for
the Indians" under section 91(24) of the 1867 Act. There is no indication
that section 35 was intended to supersede completely an established head
of Federal power such as section 91(24) . So, it follows that Aboriginal
governments and the Federal Parliament must have concurrent authority
over the matters specified in section 91(24)70
Nevertheless, given that the Aboriginal rights recognized in section
35 are protected from unjustified legislative limitation, it may be inferred
that Aboriginal laws presumptively take precedence over Federal legislation
(including laws enacted under section 91(24)), except where the need for
Federal action is compelling and substantial and the legislation is consistent
with the basic trust relationship? One such case might arise, for example,
70 See R. v. Sparrow, supra, footnote 5, at pp . 1109 (S .C .R .), 409 (D.L.R .) :
. . . we find that the words "recognition and affirmation" [in section 35] incorporate
the fiduciary relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on the
exercise of sovereign power. Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute.
Federal legislative powers continue, including, of course, the right to legislate with
respect to Indians pursuant to s . 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. These powers
must, however, now be read together with s. 35(1). In other words, federal power
must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation
is to demand the justification of any government regulation that infringes upon
or denies aboriginal rights.
71 This is the two-pronged test laid down in R. v. Sparrow, ibid, at pp . 1113-1114
(S.C.R.), 412-413 (D.L.R .) . The proposed standards of "reasonableness" and "in the public
interest" were rejected by the Supreme Court as inadequate, at pp.1113,1118-1119 (S .C.R.),
412, 416 (D.L.R.) .
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where there is a strong need for uniform laws applying to Aboriginal .peoples
across the country and it is not within the power of local Aboriginal
governments to achieve this objective (and no Canada-wide Aboriginal
government exists to supply the want). Again, it might be argued that
it is a fundamental condition of membership in Confederation that the
basic core of the Federal Criminal Law should apply uniformly across
the country.
Up to now, we have assumed only a considerable overlap between
the Aboriginal sphere of authority under section 35 and Federal power
under section 91(24) . However, for reasons of constitutional economy and
rationality, it can be argued that the two spheres are virtually identical:
that is, section 91(24) should be construed as including all matters over
which an inherent Aboriginal right of government exists, and vice versa.
This means, for example, that the term "Indians" in section 91(24), which
has already been held to include the Inuit peoples,72 should be interpreted
as covering the 1VI6tis peoples as well, since they are explicitly identified
as "aboriginal peoples".in section 35(2)73
Standing back now from the scheme, we can see that the position
of -Aboriginal governments relative to the Federal government . is similar
to that of the Provinces, while it also differs from them in certain respects .
Like the Provinces, Aboriginal governments have the power to deal with
a wide range of matters that concern their communities and territories;
further, laws enacted pursuant to this power will generally take precedence
over conflicting Federal statutes, except where where the latter satisfy the
section 35 standards laid down in the Sparrow decision. However, unlike
the Provinces, the power of Aboriginal governments is not exclusive of
the Federal Parliament, which holds concurrent authority over the entire
field under section 91(24) . So, in the absence of Aboriginal law, Federal
law will . apply. It should be remembered, nevertheless, that Aboriginal
law includes not only written enactments but also unwritten customary
law.
The relation between Aboriginal and Provincial governments is more
complex. However, it can be said that, relative to the Provinces, Aboriginal
governments have generally the same status as the Federal government,
72 See Re Term `Indians'; [1939] S.C.R . 104, [193912 D.L.R. 417.
73 Section 35(2) provides : "In this Act, `aboriginal peoples of Canada' includes the
Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada." For discussion of the scope of section 91(24)
of the Constitution Act, 1867, see, C . Chartier, `Indian' : An Analysis of the Term as Used
in Section 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867 (1978-79), 43 Sask. L . Rev .
37; Hogg, op. cit., footnote 35, pp . 552-553 ; B . Schwartz, First Principles, Second Thoughts:
Aboriginal Peoples, Constitutional Reform and Canadian Statecraft (1986), pp . 213-247;
Slattery, The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, -loc. cit., footnote
48, at pp. 269-270; Woodward, op. cit., footnote 65, pp. 53-56 .
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under the existing rules governing the division of powersa4 These rules
can be summarized as follows. The Provinces cannot legislate in relation
to subjects falling within the exclusive Federal and Aboriginal spheres,
which include all matters coming under the rubric "Indians, and Lands
reserved for the Indians" . So Provincial legislation that singles out these
subjects for special treatment is invalida5 The same holds true of ostensibly
neutral Provincial legislation that affects the subjects in some integral way.76
However, beyond these limitations, Provincial laws of general application
may validly apply to Aboriginal people and their territories so long as
the laws fall within Provincial jurisdiction and do not conflict with valid
Federal or Aboriginal laws . Where such a conflict occurs, the Federal
or Aboriginal laws will take precedence . So, within its sphere of authority,
an Aboriginal government may prevent the application of Provincial statutes
by enacting divergent legislation .77
It could be asked whether section 35 changes this position, so that
certain Provincial laws might override Aboriginal laws under the Sparrow
standard, even when this would not be possible under the normal rules
governing the division of powers . That is, does the Sparrow doctrine allow
Provincial governments greater powers vis-à-vis Aboriginal laws than it
possesses relative to Federal legislation enacted under section 91(24)? Or
does Sparrow only patrol the border between Federal and Aboriginal
74 See generally Hogg, op. cit., footnote 35, pp. 551-562; Slattery, Understanding
Aboriginal Rights, loc. cit., footnote 45, at pp . 774-781; Woodward, op. cit, footnote
65, pp . 87-131 .
75 This stricture would not, of course, invalidate provincial legislation granting
exemptions to Aboriginal peoples in recognition of their Aboriginal and treaty rights.
76 See, for example, Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1976] 2
S.C.R . 751, (1975), 60 D.L.R. (3d) 148, per Laskin C.J. for the majority at pp . 760-
761 (S.C.R.), 154 (D.L.R .) . Although made in a different context, the observations of
the Supreme Court in R. v. Sparrow, supra, footnote 5, at pp . 1110 (S.C.R .), 409-410
(D.L.R.), seem apt: "Our history has shown, unfortunately all too well, that Canada's
aboriginal peoples are justified in worrying about government objectives that may be
superficially neutral but which constitute de facto threats to the existence of aboriginal
rights and interests ."
77 This conclusion extends to Aboriginal governments the general rule governing the
interaction between Federal and Provincial powers. Thus, in R. v. Francis, [1988] 1 S.C.R.
1025, at p. 1028, (1988), 51 D.L.R. (4th) 418, at p. 421, La Forest J. stated: ". . .in
the absence of conflicting federal legislation, provincial motor vehicle laws of general
application apply exproprio vigore on Indian reserves" (Emphasis added) . Even Maitland
J., who took an expansive view of Provincial power in his minority opinion in Natural
Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, ibid, stated at pp . 744 (S .C .R .), 164 (D.L.R.):
"I do not interpret s. 91(24) as manifesting an intention to maintain a segregation of
Indians from the rest of the community in matters of this kind, and, accordingly, it is
my view that the application of the Adoption Act to Indian children will only be prevented
if Parliament, in the exercise ofitspowers under that subsection, has legislated in a manner
which wouldpreclude its application." (Emphasis added).
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governments, leaving the border between Aboriginal and Provincial go-
vernments to be handled by division of powers doctrines?
t first sight, the answer is not completely clear. ®n the one hand,
there is nothing in the text of section 35 to indicate that Aboriginal rights,
including the right of self-government, are immune from Provincial leg
islation. So, it can be argued that the Sparrow standard of justification
applies to both Federal and Provincial governments . As a result, under
section 35 Provincial laws might sometimes prevail over Aboriginal laws
when they could not override comparable Federal laws . However, this
conclusion fails to take full account of section 91(24) . Under this section,
the Federal Parliament has the exclusive authority (as amongnon-Aboriginal
governments) to deal with Indians and lands reserved for Indians. By
inference, it alone has the power to pose justified limits to the Aboriginal
and treaty rights protected by section 35 . Under section 92, the Provinces
do not possess the power to legislate in relation to Aboriginal and treaty
rights, and so the question of justification under section 35 simply does
not arise.7a In the result, while Parliament may when justified enact laws
under section 91(24) that prevail over valid Aboriginal laws, this power
is not available to the Provincial legislatures .
The same conclusion is supported by another train of thought. It
would appear that an Aboriginal government might, by delegation from
the Federal Parliament, exercise governmental powers to the exclusion of
Provincial laws . For, within the sphere of section 91(24), Federal laws
will take precedence over Provincial laws in case of conflict . Put the inherent
right of self-government recognized and protected in section 35 arguably
cannot be weaker or less extensive than a delegated right of government
under section 91(24) . So, Aboriginal laws under section 35 must enjoy
the same degree of precedence over Provincial legislation as Federal laws
under section 91(24) .
If this conclusion is correct, it follows that the Federal Parliament
cannot subvert the overall constitutional scheme by enacting legislation
for Aboriginal peoples that referentially incorporates a wide range of
Provincial statutes that could not otherwise apply to First Nations under
the division of powers . Such Federal legislation, it is submitted, would
seriously affect the Aboriginal right of self-government under section 35
of the Constitution Act, 1982 and cannot -meet the Sparrow standard of
7 $ This may be what the Supreme Court had in mind when it observed in R. v.
Sparrow, supra, footnote 5, at pp . 1105 (S.C.R .), 406 . (D.L.R.), that one of the clear
effects of section 35 was that it "affords aboriginal peoples constitutional protection against
provincial legislative power" . The court went on to observe, at pp. 1109 (S .C.R.), 409
(D.L.R.), that while section 35 imported restraints on sovereign power, the rights that
it recognized were not absolute: "Federal legislative powers continue, including, of course,
the right to legislate with respect to Indians . . ." . (Emphasis added; for full passage, see
supra, footnote 70).
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justification. So, section 88 of the current Indian Act, which referentially
makes applicable to Indians "all laws of general application from time
to time in force in any province" is of doubtful constitutional validity 79
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the "double aspect" doctrine,
which allows for the overlapping operation of Provincial and Federal laws
in many areas, also applies here .80 Thus, some general Provincial laws
will continue to govern Aboriginal peoples and territories, except where
they conflict with Aboriginal or Federal laws (or otherwise intrude on
section 35 rights).
What impact will the Charter of Rights and Freedoms have on
Aboriginal governments? This is a troublesome question, allowing for a
number of viewpoints . However, the most likely answer involves two
propositions. First, the right of self-government enjoys protection from the
Charter because it is covered by section 25 of the Charter, which shields
Aboriginal rights from Charter review .81 Second, at the same time, individual
Aboriginal persons also enjoy a measure of Charter protection in their
dealings with Aboriginal governments.
These conclusions are based on a distinction between the right of
self-government proper, and the exercise of governmental powers under
that right . The argument runs as follows. Insofar as the right of self
government is an Aboriginal right, it is not liable to be abrogated or
diminished by the provisions of the Charter because of the shield erected
in section 25. However, individual native persons are citizens of Canada
and as such possess Charter rights in their relations with governments,
including Aboriginal governments. In this respect then, the Charter will
impose some restrictions on the manner in-which Aboriginal governments
treat their own constituents, so long as these restrictions do not amount
to an abrogation or derogation from the right of self-government proper
or from other section 25 and 35 rights .82 At the same time, it seems clear
79 For discussion of this provision's effect, apart from the impact of section 35, see
Dick v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R . 309, (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 33 .
$° See Hogg, loc. cit., footnote 35, at pp . 316-318, 353-367.
81 Section 25 provides in part: "The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and
freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty
or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada . . ." For
commentary on the section, see, McNeil, The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples
of Canada, loc. cit., footnote 48 ; W. Pentney, The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of
Canada and the Constitution Act, 1982. Part I. The Interpretive Prism of Section 25 (1988),
22 U.B.C . Law Rev. 21 ; Slattery, The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty
Rights, loc. cit, footnote 48 ; B. Wildsmith, Aboriginal Peoples and Section 25 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1988).
82 It is possible to argue that section 32(1) of the Charter, which states that the Charter
applies to the Federal and Provincial legislatures and governments, exempts Aboriginal
governments from any form of Charter review by failing to mention them. However, the
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that the Charter. must be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent
with the culture and traditions of the Aboriginal people in question .83
V. The Status ofAboriginal Land Rights
We come now to the final question posed at the start, which concerns
the position of Aboriginal land rights 84 It will not be possible here to
deal with the entire range of situations found across Canada . Instead we
will focus on a single province, British Columbia, where the problem arises
in a particularly acute form . Our analysis, nevertheless, may be suggestive
for other parts of Canada as well .
The history of Aboriginal lands in British Columbia has received two
radically opposed interpretations . The first holds that laws passed in the
colony prior to its entry into Confederation absolutely extinguished Abo
riginal land rights a5 While the legislation does not contain explicit language
83 Section 27 of the Charter provides : "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner
consistent withthe preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage ofCanadians."
On the question of cultural perspective, see M. E . Turpel, Aboriginal Peoples and the
Canadian Charter : Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences (1989-90), 6 Can. Human
Rights Yearbook 3.
84 The genesis of modern legal doctrine on the subject can be traced in the following
works: G. La Forest, Natural Resources andPublic Property underthe Canadian Constitution
(1969), pp. 108-133; Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada (D . Sanders et al.), Native
Rights in Canada (1970); P.A . Cumming and N.H . Mickenberg (eds.), Native Rights in
Canada (2nd ed ., 1972); K . M . Lysyk, The Indian Title Question in Canada : An Appraisal
in the Light of Calder (1973), 51 Can. Bar Rev. 450 ; D. Sanders, The Nishga Case (1973),
B.C . Studies (no. 19) 3 ; J.C. Smith, The Concept of Native Title (1974), 24 U.T. Law
J . 1 ; B. Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples (Doctoral Thesis, Oxford
University, 1979 ; reprinted, University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979); G. .
S. Lester, The Territorial Rights of the Inuit of the Canadian Northwest Territories : A
Legal Argument (Doctoral Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1981);
L . Littlebear, A Concept of Native Title (1982), 5 Can. Legal Aid Bul . (Nos. 2 & 3)
99; B. Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws : Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title
(University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983); Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal
Rights, loc. cit, footnote 45 ; K . McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (1989); K. McNeil,
A Question of Title: Has the Common Law Been Misapplied to Disposses the Aboriginals?
(1990), 16 Monash Univ. L . Rev. 91 ; K. McNeil, The Temagami Indian Land Claim:
Loosening the Judicial Straitjacket, in M . Bray and A. Thomson (eds .), Temagami: A
Debate on Wilderness (1990), pp. 185-221 ; B. Slattery, The Legal Basis of Aboriginal
Title : Some Thoughts on the Delgamuukw Case, in F. Cassidy (ed .), Aboriginal Title
in British Columbia : Delgamuukw v . The Queen (1992).
as This was the view of Judson J ., with Martland and Ritchie JJ. concurring, in
Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, supra, footnote 4, especially at pp . 333
(S.C.R .), 159-160 (D.L.R.) . The Supreme Court of Canada split evenly on the issue, with
three other judges taking the opposing viewpoint. A seventh judge, who cast the deciding
vote, expressed no opinion on the matter, but ruled against the Aboriginal plaintiffs on
a procedural ground . The recent judgment of the British Columbia Supreme Court in
Delgamuukw v . The Queen (1991), 79 D.L.R . (4th) 185, adopts the extinguishment theory,
but, with respect, its reasoning is open to serious objections ; see, for example, H. Foster,
It Goes Without Saying: Precedent and the Doctrine of Extinguishment by Implication
in Delgamuukw et al v . The Queen (1991), 49 The Advocate 341 .
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to this effect, it does feature general provisions of the following type: "All
the lands in British Columbia, and all the mines and minerals therein,
belong to the Crown in fee."86 The clear intent of these provisions, it is
said, is to give the Crown a complete and unencumbered title to all lands
in the Province. This intent necessarily conflicts with the continued existence
of an Aboriginal interest in the lands. So, the original rights of the First
Nations of British Columbia to their ancestral homelands were terminated
at the stroke of a pen. Native peoples instantly became trespassers or bare
licensees in their own villages, gardens, fishing stations, and hunting
territories .
However, the same facts also bear a different construction . This holds
that Aboriginal title in most areas of British Columbia has never been
extinguished, either by legislation or treaty. While the legislation cited above
clearly confirms that the Crown possesses an ultimate title to all lands
in the colony, it does not otherwise affect Aboriginal land rights, which
co-exist with the ultimate title of the Crown and form a burden on it .87
So, prima facie, First Nations continue to hold Aboriginal rights to large
tracts within the Province, including certain city and town sites, industrial
areas, farms, residential properties, Provincial parks, and so on . These rights
take precedence over private rights derived from the Province (which can
confer no better rights that it possesses), and either invalidates them or
suspends their operation until the Aboriginal interest is extinguished .$$
These, then, are the main opposing viewpoints. The difficulty, it seems
to me, is that they both lead to rather implausible conclusions . To consider
the first alternative, we are asked to credit the view that the British Columbia
government might, by general language not specifically addressing the issue,
completely extinguish longstanding land rights held by the original peoples
of the territory, rights that were central to their economic survival as well
as their spiritual and cultural vitality . To the contrary, one would have
thought that very clear language indeed would be necessary to achieve
such a drastic result.
Turning now to the second alternative, we are invited to hold that
most of the economic and social life of the Province is based on a false
premise, namely the validity of land titles granted by the Provincial Crown.
On this view, most industrial, commercial, agricultural, and resource activity
in the Province isprimafacie unlawful, as interfering with the unextinguished
86 Proclamation No . 13 issued by Governor James Douglas, dated February 14th,
1859, in R.S .B.C. 1871, Appendix, p. 55 . The legislation is itemized and reviewed in
Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, ibid, at pp . 331-333, 410-413 (S .C.R.),
158-159, 214-217 (D.L.R.).
87 This was the conclusion of Hall J., with Spence and Laskin JJ. concurring, in
Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, ibid, pp . 410-411 (S .C.R.), 214-215
(D.L.R.) .
81 Subject, of course, to any applicable statutes of limitation.
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land rights of Aboriginal peoples . The same defect affects many residential
properties, so that large numbers of ordinary people may lack good titles
to their homes. Whatever considerations can be mustered to support this
view, it seems at odds with one of the law's most fundamental purposes :
to promote social order and stability.89
We seem to_ be caught, then, on the horns of a terrible dilemma.
We are urged, on the one hand, to legitimate the dispossession and
impoverishment of the First Nations of British Columbia in the name of
upholding the current social and economic order. ®n the other hand, we
are instructed to turn that order upside-down in the attempt to remedy
a century-old injustice.
I would like to suggest that the dilemma is not a real one. It assumes
that we are wedded to a rigid legal logic drawn from the law ofexpropriation,
when in fact the subject calls for flexible principles suited to large questions
of constitutional law. The dilemma treats the issue as basically identical
to an alleged statutory taking of a small tract of private land for public
purposes, . say to build a school or expand a park . In such a case, it is
a simple matter of construing the provision one way or the other. Ruling
in favour of the landowner may pose some inconvenience to government
but will hardly undermine the fundamental norms of society. Likewise,
ruling in favour of the government may occasion some distress to the
landowner but will not cause large-scale loss to entire cultural or political
groups . .
In reality, the question of Aboriginal land rights is not a narrow matter
of private right but a subject of far-reaching constitutional significance.
It calls into question the basic status and rights of indigenous nations and
the nature of their relationship with the Crown 9o These matters are
necessarily governed by foundational legal principles, which must be applied
flexibly in light of the general purposes they serve. This approach allows
us to avoid the dilemma outlined above and to entertain a variety of
intermediate solutions . Let me tentatively outline one such solution.
As seen earlier, when the Crown gained suzerainty over First Nations,
it assumed special fiduciary responsibilities, which included the duty of
shielding them from the potential depredations of incoming settlers . This
fiduciary relationship was a variation on the normal duty of protection
owed by the Crown to its subjects. It arose from the tacit arrangement
89 See the Supreme Court's observations in Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra,
footnote 16, at pp . 749-751 (S.C.R .), 22-24 (D.L.R.) .
9° See La Forest J .'s prescient statement in Paul v . Canadian Pacific Ltd (1983),
2 D.L.R. (4th) 22, at p . 34 (N.B.C.A.) that the ordinary presumptions governing takings
of land and compensation "must apply with additional force to the taking of Indian lands
because this affects the honour and good faith of the Crown". The latter consideration
has now been adopted by the Supreme Court as a constitutional standard; seeR. v . Sparrow,
supra, footnote 5, at pp. 1107-1110, 1114 (S.C.R.), 408-410, 413 (D.L.R.) .
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whereby First Nations relinquished the right to defend themselves militarily
in return for Crown protection, while remaining quasi-autonomous political
entities91
Oneof the Crown's main responsibilites was to safeguard First Nations
in their lands, which were central to Aboriginal well-being and surviva1.92
In the early days of British colonization on the Atlantic coast, land was
much in demand by settlers, leading to fraudulent purchases, unlawful
appropriations, and other abuses . These led to disputes and conflicts that
constantly threatened to get out of hand and engulf the colonies in war.
The role of the Crown, as it emerged, was dual : to protect the lands of
the native peoples against illegitimate intrusions, and to establish a fair
procedure enabling settlement to continue.
These basic factors were explicitly recognized by the British Crown
in the Royal Proclamation, 1763, which, as already noted, states that it
is essential to the security of the colonies that the Indian Nations living
under British protection should not be molested in their unsurrendered
lands. The document goes on to remark that great frauds and abuses have
been committed in purchasing Indian lands, to the prejudice of British
interests and the great dissatisfaction of the Indians. In the result, the
Proclamation outlaws private purchases of Indian lands and provides that
Aboriginal land rights can only be extinguished by voluntary surrender
to the Crown in a public session.
Three basic principles underlie the Proclamation's detailed provisions .
First, First Nations are to be protected in their lands by the Crown. Second,
legitimate settlement may take place in areas designated from time to time
by the Crown. Third, before an area can be settled, any native land rights
must be ceded voluntarily to the Crown.
There is good reason to think that the Royal Proclamation, 1763
applied to British Columbia when it was issued, or at any rate became
applicable whenever the area was officially claimed by the Crown. However,
judicial rulings are mixed on the point, and the matter has not yet been
resolved by the Supreme Court of Canada.93 Even if the Proclamation
91 See further, Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, loc. cit., footnote 45, at
pp. 753-755.
92 See the comments in Guerin v. The Queen, supra, footnote 5, at pp. 348-350,
383-384, 392 (S.C.R .), 340, 346, 356-357 (D.L.R .).
93 See the affirmative conclusion of Hall J. in Calder v. Attorney-General of British
Columbia, supra, footnote 4, at pp. 394-401 (S .C.R.), 203-208 (D.L.R .), and the opposing
view of Judson J. at pp. 323-328 (S .C.R.), 153-156 (D.L.R.); the latter view was adopted
by the British Columbia Supreme Court in Delgamuukw v. The Queen, supra, footnote
85. For detailed discussion, see Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples,
op. cit, footnote 84, pp. 63-65, 175-190, 204-282, 329-349; and Slattery, The Legal Basis
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did not apply, it seems clear that the common law principles reflected
in the Proclamation extended to British Columbia, as they did to other
parts of Canada.94
Assuming that the Proclamation covered British Columbia, the question
arises whether it could be repealed or amended locally. The issue is complex
and cannot be resolved here.95 For the sake of simplicity, I will suppose
that prior to Confederation British Columbia lawmakers didhave the power
to amend the Proclamation, without attempting to formulate a definite
view on the issue.
The central question now before us is the effect of the land laws
passed in British Columbia before Confederation. As seen earlier, on one
view this legislation extinguished Aboriginal title, while on the other it
left Aboriginal title basically undisturbed. I suggest that there is a third
possibility, which has certain advantages over the other two. ®n this view,
the legislation did not extinguish Aboriginal title or authorize its extin-
guishment by Crown act. ®n the other hand, it did not leave Aboriginal
title entirely untouched. What it did was set up a land system generally
empowering the Crown to grant private rights to lands in the Province,
even where the lands concerned were subject to Aboriginal title . In the
latter case, the Crown grants would burden the Aboriginal title but would
not extinguish it . The new rights would take precedence over the Aboriginal
title, unless or until the rights were terminated, at which point Aboriginal
title would resume full force.
However, this Provincial power was subject to significant limits
stemming from the Crows trust relationship with First Nations. The
Crown's general duty to protect Aboriginal lands, when coupled with the
statutory discretion to burden Aboriginal title, gave rise to particularfiduciary
obligations controlling the exercise of the discretion 96 Broadly speaking,
these obligations bound the Crown to strike a fair balance between the
publicgood andAboriginal interests in dealing with Aboriginal lands. Ideally,
this balance would best be struck through voluntary agreements with the
First Nations affected . Failing that, the Provincial Crown would have the
94 See Guerin v. The Queen, supra, footnote 5, at pp . 375-388 (S.C.R.), 334-43
(D.L.R.), per Dickson J.
95 See discussion and references in Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian
Peoples, op. cit., footnote 84, pp . 315-319; and Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights,
loc. cit., footnote 45, at pp . 774-775.
96 As Dickson J. states in Guerin v. The Queen, supra, footnote 5, at pp. 384 (S.C.R.),
341 (D.L.R.) :
. . . where by statute, agreement, or perhaps by unilateral undertaking, one party
has an obligation to act for the benefit of another, and that obligation carries with
it a discretionary power, the party thus empowered becomes a fiduciary. Equity
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power to make its own determinations, subject to the supervision of the
courts, which could enforce the fiduciary duties and grant appropriate
remedies .
Thus, to take a clear case, where the Provincial Crown unilaterally
granted private rights to an occupied Aboriginal village site, the grant should
ordinarily be struck down in the courts, in the absence of some compelling
governmental rationale. Where the grant could not be nullified without
seriously harming the longstanding interests of innocent third parties,
monetary compensation or other remedies might be more appropriate. Again,
where the Crown granted a timber lease covering part of a traditional
Aboriginal territory, a court might review the lease and decide to nullify
or curtail it, or perhaps to divert a fair portion of the revenues to the
First Nation affected . Obviously, it would be far preferable for the Crown
to avoid these judicial interventions by reaching agreements with the First
Nations, but in the absence of such agreements the courts have a broad
mandate to enforce the fiduciary relationship .
When British Columbia entered Confederation, the position just
described was largely maintained by section 109 of the Constitution Act,
1867, which provides that all lands belonging to the Province shall remain
its property "subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any
Interest other than that of the Province in the same". The latter phrase
has long been held to cover Aboriginal land rights,97 while the word "Trusts"
is apt to include the attendant fiduciary obligationspa Since section 91(24)
of the 1867 Act gives the Federal Parliament exclusive legislative authority
over "Indians, andLands Reserved for the Indians", henceforth the Province
lacked the power to pass laws extinguishing Aboriginal title or affecting
the fiduciary structure.99 Nevertheless, British Columbia retained the power
to manage lands located in the Province and in so doing to grant rights
burdening Aboriginal title, subject always to enforceable fiduciary duties .
The resulting inter-meshing of Provincial and Federal roles means that
any agreement with the First Nations of British Columbia regarding
97 In St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, supra, footnote 54, at
p. 58, the Privy Council held that lands encumbered by Aboriginal rights at Confederation
passed to the Province of Ontario "subject to 'an interest other than that of the Province
in the same,' within the meaning of sect. 109 . . .".
98 See, A.-G. for Canada v. A.-G. for Ontario, supra, footnote 53, at p. 210, where
the Privy Council correctly noted that the word "Trusts" in section 109 was not strictly
limited to "such proper trusts as a court of equity would undertake to administer" . As
noted, supra, footnote 53, its subsequent holding that treaties ceding Aboriginal lands do
not give rise to trust obligations has now been overruled.
99 On the view, supported by the Privy Council's observations in the St. Catherine's
case, supra, footnote 54, at p. 59, that the phrase "Lands reserved for the Indians" should
be interpreted broadly as extending to Aboriginal lands generally. For discussion, see Slattery,
Understanding Aboriginal Rights, loc. cit., footnote 45, at p. 773.
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boriginal title requires in practice the participation of both levels of
government .
These general principles provide a context for interpreting the particular
provisions governing British Columbia's entry into Confederation.100 Para-
graph 13 of the Terms of Union provides that the "charge of the Indians,
and the trusteeship and management of the lands reserved for their use
and benefit, shall be assumed by the Dominion Government", and goes
on to describe a joint Federal-Provincial process for setting aside tracts
of land for Indian use. Whatever the precise meaning of this ill-drafted
provision, it is unlikely that it nullifies the Province's power to grant rights
to lands affected by Aboriginal title; by the same token, it does not relieve
the Province of its particular fiduciary duties regarding those lands. The
duties accompany the power and restrain it.
Unextinguished Aboriginal land rights in British Columbia are now
entrenched under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . This provision
reinforces the common law trust relationship and provides the courts with
a constitutional basis for reviewing legislation adversely affecting Aboriginal
title. Insofar as the British Columbia land regime authorizes the Provincial
Crown to impose burdens on Aboriginal lands unilaterally, the courts may
now determine how far this regime can be justified under section 35 and
what remedies may be appropriate if it fails to meet the Sparrow standard.
In sum, this intermediate viewpoint, while hardly, .perfect, suggests
a way of recognizing the continuing Aboriginal land rights of First Nations
in British Columbia, without threatening to overturn completely the existing
order. By allowing for the possibility ofjudicial intervention, it also provides
the parties with a strong stimulus to settle these matters by voluntary
agreement.
Conclusion
The doctrine of constitutional trust, then, brings to the fore certain premises
tacitly embedded in the law and practice of the Canadian Constitution,
and as such helps to clarify the status of First Nations within Confederation.
While the doctrine has clear theoretical dimensions, it may also help to
solve certain practical problems long besetting relations between Aboriginal
peoples and the Crown. Beyond this, the word "trust" aptly conveys the
outlook that must increasingly come to inform relations among the various
peoples of Canada, if we are to share a future together . To recall some
words quoted earlier: "The faces of our future generations are looking
up to us from the earth; and we step with great care . . .9.101
100 Order of Her Majesty in Council Admitting British Columbia into the Union,
issued the 16th of May, 1871 .
101 supra, footnote 20 .
